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ABSTRACT
The aggression of the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav Army in 1992 caused
the dissolution of the health care system of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which was unable to sustain itself without external assistance. In 1992
and early 1993, this assistance was provided almost exclusively by the
Republic of Croatia, whereas the involvement of the international commu-
nity began to materialize only from late 1993 onwards. Through the
heroic efforts of local communities, Croatia and the international commu-
nity secured the most basic level of health care for segments of the popu-
lation in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina not occupied by Serbian forces.
However, the preservation and improvement of that health care system
since the end of the war has been almost completely dependent on the
support of the international community. A country cannot secure its own
future if it is not able to establish and maintain a basic social system, such
as the health care system. Therefore, the international community’s efforts
to preserve the independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina might fail
unless a serious reevaluation of current approaches does not occur. 
Introduction
As one of six constituent republics of former Yugoslavia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) has been relatively undeveloped,
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ethnically mixed, and burdened with all the major economical,
ethnical and religious problems which characterized the former
Yugoslavia. The ruling force in the former Yugoslavia was the
Communist Party, which tightly controlled all segments of social
and economic life down to the level of the local community.  This
was not a promising starting point for the successful development
and democratization of the individual republics when the former
Yugoslavia disintegrated. In addition to this, the population of
B&H was poorly educated as a whole, and suffered from complex
ethnic and religious tensions. Even the minimal chance for a nor-
mal and peaceful transformation of B&H was destroyed by
attempts of the nationalist Serbian Communist Party to create a
“Greater Serbia” with the assistance of the Serbian-dominated
Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA). Moreover, in the decade preced-
ing the outbreak of the war, the Serbian ethnic entity had a dis-
proportionately large and influential role in the institutions of B&H
(9).
The health care system of B&H was a part of the larger, uni-
fied health care system of the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, the
central administrative bodies and the most complex and special-
ized (tertiary) health care services were situated largely, if not
exclusively, in Belgrade (the capital of Serbia and former
Yugoslavia) (20).  Since the civilian and military components of the
health care system were separate in the former Yugoslavia, the sit-
uation was even worse with respect to military medical service: the
central administration, as well as most important infrastructure
(e.g., Military Medical Academy) of that service, was in Belgrade
(3). There were several military hospitals in major cities of other
Yugoslav republics (Ljubljana, Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Skoplje), but
these hospitals were unable to independently organize and per-
form wartime medical services. 
The Health Care System During the War
After its complete retreat from Slovenia and Croatia during
1990/91, and partial retreat from Sarajevo in the spring of 1992,
the JNA confiscated most of the medical equipment and material.
Since the majority of employees (medical doctors, medical techni-
cians, and nurses) in military hospitals were active officers of the
JNA, they retreated together with the army. The consequences
were devastating: the medical institutions were left without equip-
ment, supplies and professional staff (6).
The situation in B&H was aggravated even further because,
at the beginning of the 1990s, the civilian health care system of
B&H suffered from a serious lack of sophisticated medical equip-
ment; the supplies of drugs and other medical materials were
almost exhausted; and there were very few highly educated med-

























tion in larger B&H cities (e.g., Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Mostar,
Foèa, Bihaæ). In other smaller cities and large rural parts of B&H,
conditions were disastrous (1, 17).
In April 1992, the JNA began a “creeping” occupation of
B&H.  The first skirmishes in Sarajevo and the more extensive JNA
operations against the joint Croatian and Bosniac-Muslim defense
forces in the area of Kupres in central B&H, and in Brèko and
Bijeljina in north-east B&H, led to the complete breakdown of the
civilian health care system in B&H. Therefore, both the civilian
population and the ill-equipped Croatian-Bosniac military forces
were deprived of organized and effective health care (2).
On the other hand, western Herzegovina - the part of B&H
territory situated along the border of southern Croatia and popu-
lated predominantly by Croats - had a slight but significant advan-
tage: the health care system of Croatia was prepared to assist that
part of the B&H population in every possible manner.  During April
and May of 1992, newly formed defense forces of the Croat-
Bosniac coalition in western Herzegovina and Central Bosnia
were equipped with their first military medical units due to exten-
sive logistical support from Croatia (15). These medical units
cared not only for wounded soldiers, but also for diseased civil-
ians and large numbers of displaced persons and refugees who
were either settled in that part of B&H, or were in transition to
neighbouring Croatia. Furthermore, the Croatian hospital in Split,
Dalmatia, served from the onset of the aggression as the tertiary
health care center for both civilians and soldiers from B&H (6).
In the subsequent months and years, this would prove crucial
for the health care, and thus survival, of the major part of the
Bosniac B&H population as well.  In neighbouring parts of B&H
populated predominantly by Bosniac-Muslims, e.g. in the areas of
Konjic, Jablanica and Central Bosnia, this benefit was immediate-
ly realized. The same applies to the Posavina region, situated in
the northern part of B&H along the river Sava River, bordering with
Croatia. For that region in the north, the Croatian hospital in
Slavonski Brod played a role equivalent to that of the Split hospi-
tal in the south (18).
On the other hand, those parts of B&H which were populat-
ed predominantly by Bosniac-Muslims, but which were complete-
ly surrounded by Serbian and JNA forces, were deprived of such
assistance. The health care system in those regions had not only
disintegrated but was also exposed to continual attacks by Serbian
JNA and paramilitary forces. And with the exception of a few iso-
lated enclaves (Gora de and Srebrenica), the Bosniac-Muslim
population of those regions was ethnically cleansed, i.e. expelled
from its settlements and/or detained in concentration camps.
During June and July of 1992, Croatian forces (HVO =




























= Territorial Defence of B&H) attempted to establish a basic
health care system in the remaining parts of Central Bosnia and
in the region north of Sarajevo. The major problem was that, as a
consequence of Serbian aggression and the dissolution of the
civilian health care system of B&H, a number of medical workers
from the cities of Jajce, Travnik, Zenica, epèe, Fojnica and
Sarajevo had already abandoned their medical institutions and
had attempted to escape from B&H to a safe country. But the
efforts of these forces eventually led to the establishment of at
least the military medical component in that part of B&H (19,16).
During this entire period, which was characterized by brutal
Serbian and JNA aggression and the tremendous suffering of the
civilian population, Croats and Bosniac-Muslims were left com-
pletely to their own devices. Assistance from the international
community was conspiciously lacking, although UN forces and
allied international humanitarian institutions (e.g., UNHCR, ICRC)
were already present in neighboring parts of Croatia and actively
engaged in monitoring the situation in B&H.
Further additions and improvements to the health care system
continued during the second half of 1992 and during 1993,
although that period was already characterized by the first con-
flicts between Croatian HVO forces and Bosniac-Muslim TO
forces (13,12). However, these military conflicts did not prevent
cooperation in the area of health care, which was a necessity for
the survival of both parties and depended on support from the
civilian and military health care system of the Republic of Croatia
(14). This activity was coordinated by the Croatian Medical
Headquarters in Zagreb, and continued operating successfully
until the end of the war in 1995. In spite of the Croatian-Bosniac
military conflicts, both parties continued to cooperate in the evac-
uation of displaced persons and refugees, and the Croatian
health care system continued to provide medical care and treat-
ment for ill Bosniac-Muslim civilians as well as for wounded
Bosniac-Muslim soldiers (for details, see the paper by Kostoviæ &
Henigsberg in this issue). In this respect, the hospitals in Split,
Slavonski Brod, Osijek, upanja and Zagreb carried the major
burden. Although complete and exact data is not yet available,
preliminary data show that at least 10,000 wounded soldiers and
civilians from Bosanska Posavina alone were treated in Croatian
hospitals in Slavonski Brod, Osijek, upanja and Zagreb. This
represented an additional burden to the Croatian health care sys-
tem, which was already devastated by Serbian aggression during
the 1991-1992 war in Croatia (4). Although the United States
and European countries delivered drugs and other medical sup-
plies during this period, the amounts were minimal and were


























The role of the International Community
The major international humanitarian institutions such as
UNHCR, ICRC, Medecines sans frontieres and others were
engaged in crisis management in B&H only from the beginning of
1993. By that time, Serbian and JNA forces had already taken
control of over 70% of total B&H territory, and one million
Bosniac-Muslims and Croats had been driven into the remaining
quarter of B&H territory. The major burden for the care of this
huge and desperate population, which consisted mainly of dis-
placed persons and refugees, fell again to the Republic of Croatia
(for details, see K&H article in this issue).
In the spring of 1993, the international community attempted
to establish several primary health care centers in larger and rel-
atively safe cities, such as Zenica and Tuzla, with the aim of rein-
vigorating the former health system with medical supplies and a
small number of medical professionals (11). They were not suc-
cessful in Zenica and Tuzla, as they benefited almost exclusively
the Bosniac-Muslim population, since, at that time, the humani-
tarian efforts of the international community were focused on
Bosniac-Muslims, considering them the weakest party in the war.
On the other hand, the result of the growing conflicts between
Croatian and Bosniac-Muslim forces was that the only remaining
hospital in the western part of Mostar was admitting only wound-
ed Croatian soldiers (although civilian patients were admitted
regardless of ethnicity).
Additionally, the remaining medical professionals continued
to abandon B&H.  By the end of 1995, only a third remained in
B&H. Unfortunately, representatives of the international communi-
ty did nothing to prevent that process, and, in fact, actively assist-
ed medical doctors and nurses to escape, even from parts of B&H
which were relatively safe, i.e. not exposed to direct military activ-
ities (14).
During the first half of 1994, the situation in B&H was as fol-
lows: large numbers of Bosniac-Muslims were completely sur-
rounded by the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav Army and paramili-
tary forces in several enclaves in western B&H (Bihaæ area) and
eastern B&H (Srebrenica and Gora de), while approximately
200,000 Croats were completely surrounded by Bosniac-Muslim
forces in Central Bosnia. All these enclaves were completely cut
off from the health care systems of western Herzegovina and the
Republic of Croatia. Therefore, international community repre-
sentatives and institutions were the only remaining source of pos-
sible aid to the populations of those besieged enclaves, especial-
ly since the ICRC and health care-oriented NGOs had relatively
safe access to these areas. However, the international effort was
focused on Sarajevo, and efforts to improve the situation in other
besieged enclaves were of a political nature, leading ultimately to151
negotiations which resulted in the Washington Agreement in
March, 1994. 
Although the representatives of some humanitarian organ-
izations and medical volunteers managed to enter some of the
besieged areas under the auspices of UN forces, their activities
were badly-coordinated, inefficient and occasionally even
biased by ruling policies of their parent countries (13).
Nonetheless, during the second half of 1994 and the first
half of 1995, a number of international humanitarian organi-
zations attempted to establish some sort of health care system
in the remaining part of B&H which was controlled by the
Croatian HVO or Bosniac-Muslim TO forces. These efforts con-
sisted mainly in attempts to establish small-scale models of
modern, “western-style” health care organizations (7).
However, these attempts were usually ill-prepared and based
on standards of procedure which were appropriate to affluent
western societies, but inefficient in the contemporary B&H situ-
ation, and thus led to false and unrealistic expectations. Some
of these international efforts could be characterized as expen-
sive but useless field experiments conducted by foreign experts
and/or institutions.
The representatives of local communities played only minor
roles in the planning and execution of these international
humanitarian efforts (8). However, this was partly due to the
chaotic military and political situation arising from clashes
among different, local interest groups. Additionally, the situa-
tion was abused by certain paramilitary or criminal groups
which attempted to seize control over the delivery and distribu-
tion of goods. Even members and/or small units of internation-
al humanitarian organizations and UN forces were accused of
taking part in such ignoble activities, and, on some occasions,
were found guilty (5).
These humanitarian crises were ultimately resolved in the
following way: in July, 1995, the Serbian-dominated JNA and
paramilitary forces occupied the enclaves of Srebrenica and
Gora de;  Bosniac-Muslims of that area were victims of mass
murders and ethnic rape, and survivors were detained in con-
centration camps or expelled. There was an imminent threat
that the Bihaæ area would soon suffer the same destiny. This
outcome was prevented by the large-scale military operation
“Storm”, conducted by the Croatian Army, the primary aim of
which was the final liberation of parts of Croatia still occupied
by Serbian paramilitary forces. However, one of the most
important goals of that operation was the prevention of a
humanitarian disaster in the Bihaæ area (21). The extension of
that operation onto the territory of western B&H, which led to

























territory, had the full support of the Croatian military and civilian
medical institutions and units. As a consequence, the population
of Croats and Bosniac-Muslims in Bihaæ and Central Bosnia
regained access to already-existing health care services in other
parts of B&H territory controlled by Croatian or Bosniac-Muslim
forces.  
Conclusions
After the outbreak of war and aggression of the Serbian-dom-
inated Yugoslav Army against Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992,
the social and economic structure of that multiethnic community
began rapidly disintegrating. Because it was one of the most vul-
nerable social systems, the health care system of B&H was espe-
cially endangered. The Serbian forces occupied almost three
quarters of the B&H territory and thus drove the Croatian and
Bosniac-Muslim populations into the remaining one fourth of the
country. The health care system of the country was unable to sus-
tain itself without the assistance of the neighbouring Republic of
Croatia and the international community. Since the burden of that
aid in 1992 and 1993 was carried exclusively by Croatia, the
international community became involved only at the end of
1993. However,  joint Croatian and Bosniac-Muslim forces were
able to provide medical care and treatment only upon the territo-
ry under their control, and international efforts were focused on
besieged Sarajevo. As a result, during 1994 and the spring of
1995, large and isolated enclaves in western, central and eastern
B&H were forced to fight for survival without any organized health
care system. After the fall of Srebrenica and the large-scale mili-
tary operations in the summer of 1995, the balance of military
power in B&H was radically changed in favor of Croatian and
Bosniac-Muslim forces, which enabled the successful termination
of  the war under the Dayton Agreement.
After the arrival of thousands of NATO troops (from January
1996 onwards), the NATO Medical Service began to establish
health care centers for the support of their own troops. A number
of these centers were established during 1996 and 1997, e.g. in
Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, as well as at the Zagreb airport “Pleso”.
However, the civilian population of B&H did not (and still does
not) enjoy benefits from these centers, since the NATO Medical
troops were not directly engaged in providing health care to the
local population, although they tried to help indirectly, through
assistance to various NGOs and education of local medical work-
ers. The technological and organizational gap between NATO
Medical troops and local medical workers has been so wide that
attempts to bridge that gap have had only symbolic value. The
number of properly trained and fully qualified medical doctors153
and nurses in B&H is still insufficient, and the existing health care
system is still entirely dependent on external assistance and guid-
ance. In spite of huge investments to improve this system, the
international community still faces a long and uphill battle.  The
crucial question is: how long will the international community sup-
port the lack of progress on the part of the B&H government in
implementing modern standards of health care?
Can an analysis of the health care system in a war-torn coun-
try provide useful and important lessons on operational methods
of international peace-keeping forces during humanitarian crises
caused by local military conflicts? On the basis of the evidence
presented, the answer is affirmative.
Obviously, there are countries which, when exposed to brutal
and unexpected aggression, are unable to organize even basic
systems crucial for the survival of the nation (such as the health
care system) without outside assistance. In the event that the inter-
national community undertakes aid to such countries, it must be
clear that routine approaches and procedures are doomed to fail-
ure. New approaches are needed, developed and designed for
the local population and environment. International efforts must
rely on the customs and resources of the local population, and
officials must acknowledge the fact that, without cooperation from
neighbouring countries, the best intentions and plans cannot suc-
ceed.  
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